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ABSTRACT 
In this research, road pavement maintenance by contract in Jordan was investigated. For this purpose, a 
subjective procedure (the Present Serviceability Rating (PSR)) was used to evaluate pavement serviceability. 
Three major highways (Jarash-Amman highway, Naour-Dead Sea highway and Zarqa-Syrian borders highway) 
that were maintained by contract were selected. The developed data base included information on pavement 
characteristics, traffic type and volume and routine maintenance cost. The effect of maintenance cost on 
pavement serviceability was estimated by developing a statistical relationship between maintenance cost and 
pavement serviceability rating before and after maintenance. The results showed that the pavement serviceability 
of Jarash-Amman highway and Naour-Dead Sea highway was adversely affected after applying maintenance by 
contract. The pavement serviceability of Zarqa-Syrian borders highway was slightly improved after applying 
maintenance by contract, but the improvement was not up to expectations. It is believed that the reasons for such 
results are a combination of the contractor’s poor experience and qualification and the timing of maintenance 
where the pavement was left without maintenance until it reached fair or poor condition.  
Keywords : Maintenance, Contract, Pavement , Highway, Serviceability. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the nation’s highways age and deteriorate, some 
types of treatment is eventually required to provide a safe 
and serviceable facility for the users. The types of 
treatments can range from simple maintenance to 
complete reconstruction, it also may be performed in 
different ways, among which is maintenance by contract. 
Regardless of the type and method of treatment, 
maintenance strategies should be based on accurate 
understanding of pavement condition and maintenance 
needs (Khader, 1991). Furthermore, maintenance 
function objectives should be expanded to accommodate 
the increased operational requirements due to the 
numerous increasing numbers of motor vehicles using the 
highway networks. Due to this fact, it is believed that the 
function objectives of maintenance should include 
(Transportation Research Board, 1986); maintaining the 
investments spent on constructing the highway facilities, 
keeping adequate levels of service, decreasing the 
operating costs of the users and increasing the safety of 
the traveling public. 
In both developed and developing countries, 
maintenance of highway networks was mainly the 
responsibility of the government direct labor. The 
inefficiency of the direct labor operation encouraged the 
decision makers to involve the private sector in highway 
maintenance. Not only this, but increasing the size and 
scope of operations of private sector involvement in 
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highway maintenance became a priority in many 
developing countries (International Labor Organization, 
2004). Highway agencies in many developed countries 
have successfully switched from direct labor to contract 
maintenance. Different approaches were adopted 
worldwide in implementing maintenance by contract 
(Parkman et al., 2001). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of  the Evaluated Pavement Sections. 
 
 Highway Number of Sections  
Average 
Width of 
Sections   (m)  
Total  Length 
of Sections  
(m) 
     
 Na’our-Dead Sea 20 3.6 44700 
 Amman-Jarash 22 3.6 45330 
 Zarqa-Syrian Borders 32 3.7 61000 
     
Total  74  151030 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the Evaluated Pavement Sections that Received Maintenance. 
 
 Highway Number of Sections  
Average 
Width of 
Sections   (m)  
Total 
 Length of 
Sections  (m) 
     
 Na’our-Dead Sea 6 3.6 16400 
 Amman-Jarash 10 3.6 27330 
 Zarqa-Syrian Borders 6 3.6 17600 
     
Total  22  61330 
 
Among the developing countries that tried to switch 
to maintenance by contract is Jordan.  Highways in 
Jordan have dramatically developed since 1950. The total 
length of the highway network increased from  895 
kilometers in 1950 to 7304 kilometers in 2002 (Ministry 
of Housing and Public Works, 2003). Jordan applied 
maintenance by contract for the first time in 2001. The 
maintenance of three primary highways was carried by 
local contractors (one year, unit price-based contract); 
Na’our-Dead Sea highway, Amman-Jarash highway and 
Zarqa-Syrian borders highway (two years, unit price-
based contract) (Ministry of Housing and Public Works, 
2003). 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Types of Maintenance by Contract 
Unit Price Contract: It is the most widely used 
method for delivery of highway maintenance services, 
with a clearly defined estimate of quantities, but some 
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flexibility is allowed for payment of amount of work 
significantly beyond those estimated originally. In a 
survey conducted in Belgium, Brazil, France, Kenya, 
Malaysia, United Kingdom, Algeria, Canada (British 
Columbia), Chile and Pakistan, it was found that all these 
countries have procedure to include new items in the 
contract that are not originally included in it. Payment is 
based on actual quantities. Overall, the lowest price is the 
base for the selection of successful bidder (World Bank, 
2004).  
 
Table 3. Statistical Characteristics of the Selected Variables for  Sections that Received Maintenance and 
for All Pavement Sections. 
 
Highway Age (years) 
Sub-grade 
CBR Value 
 (%) 
Average Daily Traffic Number of Trucks 
 Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
         
Na’our-Dead 
Sea 11.5 10-13 24.2 15-33 4258 3646-4870 1371 1307-1435 
Amman-Jarash 10 - 41.4 15-51 52732 14145-91319 264 253-274 
Zarqa-Syrian 
Borders 13.5 - 35.3 28-60 30442 8872-52952 4398 256-20107 
         
All Highways 11.5 10-13.5 35.1 15-60 60426 3646-91319 565 253-20107 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Results and Statistical Characteristics Obtained for the PSR and Cost for Sections that 
Received Maintenance and for All Pavement Sections. 
 
Highway PSRb PSRa ∆PSR = PSRa-PSRb 
Maintenance Cost 
(JD/lane-km) 
 Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean Range 
         
Na’our-Dead Sea 2.93 0.60 2.75 0.47 -0.18 0.91 187.5 0-1281 
Amman-Jarash 3.87 0.48 3.37 0.61 -0.50 0.80 261.8 0-1484 
Zarqa-Syrian 
Borders 2.75 0.47 2.64 0.54 -0.11 0.31 161.0 0-1189 
         
All Highways 3.13 0.7 2.89 0.62 -0.24 0.68 198.0 0-1484 
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Lump Sum Contracts (Performance Type): Few 
countries have adopted long-term performance type or 
results – based contracts instead of unit price-based short-
term maintenance contracts. This approach includes either 
routine maintenance activities alone, or both the 
rehabilitation and routine maintenance of highway  
network included  in an  integrated  contract  (Cabana et 
al.,  1999). 
Another form of performance-based contracts is the 
warranty-type contract. It is a total asset management 
contract while the contractor warranties the work for a 
long period of time, mostly about 20 years.  
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Cost Plus Contract: In cost plus contract, the 
contractor is paid the total cost of the maintenance works 
plus a stated percentage of profit. It was found out that 
the countries surveyed have been stopped to use this type 
of contract (i.e. Brazil) because it doesn’t enhance 
productivity (World Bank, 2004). 
The Hybrid Contract: The hybrid contract is a 
mixture of outcome and output based. The development 
of this model is considered in New Zealand as the 
stepping-stone to PSMC model.  This model has been let 
with a 5 years tenure (2+1+1+1), with a performance 
review target required to be met for annual rollover 
(Hunter and Kyle, 2004). 
 
Experience of Developed Countries 
The contract maintenance activities are increasing in 
Canada, Great Britain and the United States of America. 
For example, in Great Britain the governmental 
maintenance organizations must bid against contractors 
for maintenance activities. Also, in the last few years the 
Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communication 
in Canada has greatly increased the use of private 
contractors to provide winter maintenance. This ministry 
policy is to use maintenance by contract where financial 
analysis and assessment indicate that costs will be 
reduced . 
Earl (2004) discussed the privatization program of the 
maintenance of highways and bridges which was 
announced by the government of British Columbia. The 
government was responsible for 47024 kilometers of 
highways, 2645 bridges and 2700 employees. The 
government offered four options for the employees and 
they must accept one of them: transfer to the private 
sector, stay with the government and accept to serve 
anywhere in any position, retire early or quit the 
governmental jobs. However, compensation pay was not 
available under any option. 
In 1988, 2280 employees were transferred to the new 
road and bridge maintenance contractors, about 20 took 
early retirement, few resigned and only 20 stayed with 
the government. All of this was at the end of the process 
for the first round of contracts. Recently, the government 
of British Columbia finished the fourth round of 
contracting a project of five year period with a cost of 
$1.5 Billion. In this round, 16 contracts were performed 
by companies owned by people who were employees of 
the government.  
The Portuguese national highway agency model, called 
Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO), was discussed 
by Fernandes and Viegas (Fernandes and Viegas, 1999). Six 
contracts were tendered under DBFO model, the total length 
of highways maintained was 830 km. The private sector 
under each contract constructed or upgraded a highway and 
maintained it for 30 years. In return, the concessionaire 
would be paid by the agency according to the number of 
vehicle-kilometers driven on the highway. 
The Australian experience in maintenance by contract 
was described by Frost and Lithgow (Frost and Lithgow, 
2004). After the success of the two pilot maintenance by 
contract projects, the Highway and Traffic Authority of 
New South Wales contracted the maintenance of a large 
proportion of the arterial highway network in Sydney, 
New South Wales. The Performance Specified 
Maintenance Contract (PSMC) was the type of contract 
used. The terms of the contract were that the contractor 
should reach a certain condition standard for a period of 
ten years in return for a fixed payment stream. 
According to a USA study held in 1995 of 120 local 
governments, the results showed that 37 percent of cities 
used maintenance by contract for highway maintenance 
services. It was found that performing the highway 
maintenance by contract costs half as much as delivering 
the maintenance by agency personal and equipment 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 
Experience of Developing Countries 
In Ghana, most of the routine maintenance is 
performed under contract. At the beginning, the contract 
duration was two months, which created a lot of contracts 
which confuse the administrator. Therefore, the system 
changed to one-year contract to carryout all the routine 
maintenance of a group of highways, and by the 
beginning of the year the quantity of work is estimated 
(Parkman et al., 2001). 
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Harrel (1987) pointed to few successes in founding 
institution in the developing countries, which have the 
ability to sustain cost-effective highway maintenance 
with local resources although the World Bank assisted 
them. The lack of success is due to the absence of 
accountability in the maintenance organization (in other 
words the public sector normally carried out 
maintenance, also it is responsible for planning, 
controlling and executing maintenance). The public 
sector found it difficult to attract high quality staff 
because of low salaries and lack of pay incentives. 
Generally, low output occurs because of the lack of 
available equipments. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this research, the Pavement Serviceability Rating 
(PSR) is used to evaluate the pavement performance. This 
is a subjective method that reflects the comfort of the 
highway users. The RSR is the mean of individual ratings 
for a pavement section made by specialized panel of 
people. It was developed at the AASHTO Road Test (8) 
and currently used by the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing (MPWH) in Jordan.  
The three highways, which were maintained by 
contract in Jordan are Na’our-Dead Sea highway (45km), 
Amman-Jarash highway (46km), and Zarqa-Syrian 
borders highway (62 km), they are all primary highways. 
Each highway was divided into homogenous pavement 
sections according to the following variables; pavement 
structure (including materials and thicknesses), traffic 
volume and pavement age. Table (1) (Shdeifat, 2006) 
shows the distribution of all the evaluated pavement 
sections, while Table (2) (Shdeifat, 2006) shows the 
distribution of the evaluated pavement sections that 
received maintenance only. Table (3) (Shdeifat, 2006) 
presents the statistical characteristics of the selected 
variables for all sections, while Table (4) (Shdeifat, 2006) 
presents the statistical characteristics of the selected 
variables for the sections that received maintenance only. 
The PSR rating in this study was done by a panel of 
five persons, each pavement section was evaluated by 
driving a passenger vehicle at the posted speed limit, then 
each section was rated by each member of the panel 
independently on a scale between 0 and 5. The PSR of 
the pavement section under evaluation is then determined 
as the mean value of the five ratings. The PSR mean 
values were used to evaluate the pavement serviceability 
as follows: failed if (0 ≤≤ PSR 1), poor if (1 ≤< PSR 2), 
fair if (2 ≤< PSR 3), good if (3 ≤< PSR 4) and very good 
if (4< ≤PSR 5). This procedure was performed on 
sections before maintenance by contract was being 
performed, and then repeated for sections that had 
received maintenance. The cost of maintenance in Jordan 
Dinars (JD) per lane kilometer was also estimated to 
investigate the effect of cost on pavement serviceability 
(1 JD = 1.5 USD). 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE 
COST MODELS 
 
Using the curve estimation of Statistical Packages for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) software, and among different 
maintenance cost models tried, the cubic and linear 
models were found the best to fit the investigated 
highways as follows:  
Maintenance Cost Model for Jarash-Amman 
Highway: For this highway, the best fit model found was 
the cubic model with R2 value of 0.43. The developed 
model is shown in Equation (1). 
 
)1(1032.4
10303.70017.0576.3
39
26
Cost
CostCostPSRa
××
+××−×+=
−
−
   
 
Maintenance Cost Model for Zarqa-Syrian Borders 
Highway: For this highway, the best fit model found was 
a linear one with R2 value of 0.68. The found model is 
shown in Equation (2). 
 
CostPSRa ××+= −410248.3971.1                                (2) 
 
Maintenance Cost Model for Na’our – Dead Sea  
Highway: For this highway, the best fit model was also 
found  a linear one with R2 value of 0.65. The found 
model is shown in Equation (3).  
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CostPSRa ××−= −410744.4363.3                               (3) 
 
where:  
 
PSRa =  Present Serviceability Rating after maintenance 
(0-5). 
Cost =   Maintenance cost (JD/lane-km). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Results and statistical characteristics obtained for PSR 
before maintenance (PSRb), PSR after maintenance 
(PSRa), change in the PSR due to performing 
maintenance by contract (∆PSR = PSRa-PSRb) and the 
cost of maintenance (JD/lane-kilometer) for all sections 
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Figure 3. Distribution of PSRb and PSRa for 
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are all illustrated in Table (5), while Table (6) shows 
them for the sections that received maintenance only. The 
distribution of PSRb and PSRa for Na’our-Dead Sea 
highway, Amman-Jarash highway, and Zarqa-Syrian 
Borders highway are shown in Figures (1,2 and 3), 
respectively. More details on PSRb and PSRa of each 
pavement section for the three highways are illustrated in 
Figures (4) through (9). In these figures, sections taken in 
North, South, East and West bounds are shown. This will 
clarify the sections that had improved after maintenance, 
and vice versa. The mean values of maintenance cost is 
illustrated in Table (5) for all investigated sections and 
for particular sections that had received maintenance.    
Figures (7,8 and 9) illustrate the relationship between 
the maintenance cost for each individual section – if any - 
and the change in PSR before and after maintenance of 
all sections (North, South, West and East bounds) for 
Na’our-Dead Sea highway, Amman-Jarash highway, and 
Zarqa-Syrian Borders highway, respectively. These 
relationships will give a precise idea about the effect of 
maintenance cost on the serviceability of an individual 
pavement section.  
When maintenance cost models is considered , it is 
important to mention that the Jarash-Amman highway 
model was found to be not statically significant, while the 
Zarqa - Syrian Borders highway, and the Na’our - Dead 
Sea highway models were found statistically significant 
at a level of .05.0=α  Figure (10) shows a comparison 
among the developed maintenance cost models for the 
three investigated highways.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
General 
A total 0f 74 pavement sections which varied in length 
from 800m to 9500m (total length of 151030m) were 
considered in this research. These sections represent three 
primary roads in Jordan. Of all the considered sections, 
around 82% were evaluated as follows; 100% of the 
sections were taken on Na’our Dead Sea highway, 91% of 
the sections were taken on Amman-Jarash highway and 
62.5% of the sections were taken on Zarqa-Syrian Borders 
highway. Sections that had received maintenance 
(61330m) represent 40.6% of all the considered sections, 
and around 49.4% of the evaluated sections. Only 27.4% 
(16800m) of the sections that had received maintenance 
were evaluated. In the evaluation process, the following 
variables were considered; PSRb, PSRa, ∆PSR, pavement 
age in years, Average Daily Traffic (ADT), Number of 
Trucks (NT), sub-grade CBR values and surface course 
thickness. The statistical characteristics of all the above 
mentioned variables (for the three investigated highways) 
are presented in Tables (3) and (4). 
 
PSRb and PSRa 
Figure (1) illustrates the PSR condition for Na’our-
Dead Sea highway. It shows that none of the sections was 
in very good condition, not even after maintenance. 50% of 
the sections were in good condition before maintenance, 
this ratio remained the same after maintenance. A slight 
improvement took place after maintenance on sections that 
were in poor conditions, they were decreased from 10% 
before maintenance to only 5% after maintenance. For the 
fair category sections, a slight increase was noticed, the 
percentage was increased from 40% before maintenance to 
45 % after maintenance. 
When Jarash-Amman highway is considered (Figure 
2), results showed that sections that were in good 
condition decreased from 82% before maintenance to 
only 45%, this is considered a significant decrease. An 
improvement in sections in the very good condition 
category took place, the percentage of sections had 
increased from only 9% before maintenance to 23% after 
maintenance. A better result was obtained for sections in 
the fair condition category, the percentage had increased 
from 9% to 32%. 
Finally, for Zarqa-Syrian Borders highway, over and 
above, similar results were obtained. There were no 
sections in the very good condition category, not even 
after maintenance. Sections in the good condition 
category remained the same, that is 28%. A slight 
increase was recorded in the percentage of sections in the 
fair condition category, while sections in the poor 
condition category decreased from 3% to 0%. 
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Further discussion of the above results may lead to the 
following conclusions; a slight improvement took place 
in sections of poor and fair condition categories. It is 
believed that sections in poor and fair condition 
categories were left without maintenance for a very long 
time until they reached the poor to fair condition, this 
means that these sections were so much disturbing the 
users, and they need major maintenance work, thus,  any 
sort of maintenance is better than nothing and may 
improve its condition regardless whether this 
maintenance was properly performed or not. It is 
important to mention that these sections are a minority 
when compared to sections in the good condition 
category.  
What may be an evidence on the truth of the above 
conclusion is the situation of the sections in the good 
condition category which form the majority of all 
sections. The percentage of the sections in this category 
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Jarash-Amman Highway. 
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remained the same or decreased after maintenance, or in 
other words, maintenance did not improve the condition 
of the pavement sections. Since these sections were in 
good condition before maintenance, the user was 
satisfied, and it is believed that any improper application 
of maintenance may appear and will be noticed by the 
user which in turn may decrease the condition category of 
the pavement section.  
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Figure 7. Relationship between Maintenance cost and ∆PSR  for Na'our-
Dead Sea Highway. 
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Finally, when sections of very good condition 
category is under focus, someone may say the following; 
these sections are in very good condition, and the 
maintenance work needed is so simple and limited. 
Because of this, there is no chance that maintenance work 
could be improperly performed. This will absolutely 
increase the satisfaction of the users. These sections were 
a minority in Jarash-Amman highway only, and may not 
be representative. 
Figures (4,5 and 6) illustrate the PSRb and the PSRa 
for each individual section. It is clear that the PSRa is less 
than the PSRb for most of the sections. This complies 
with the above conclusions in term of that sections of 
good condition category - which form the majority of all 
the sections - remained the same or decreased. According 
to these figures, the decrease in the sections of good 
condition caused the increase in the percentage of 
sections of fair condition (this is clear for the case of 
Amman-Jarash Highway); that is the condition of most of 
sections in the good category was reduced to fair category 
after maintenance. 
 
Effect of Maintenance Cost on Pavement Serviceability 
Figures (7,8 and 9) illustrate the relationship between 
maintenance cost and ∆PSR. When ∆PSR is positive, it 
means that the pavement section condition was adversely 
affected by maintenance and visa versa. As shown in the 
figures, many sections that were maintained had a positive 
∆PSR, this means that these sections were adversely 
affected by maintenance. On the other hand, other sections 
were improved when applying maintenance. The degree of 
improvement depends on the cost of maintenance. Most of 
the sections that had received routine maintenance (low 
cost maintenance) did not improve. This finding supports 
the above mentioned conclusions.  
 
Maintenance Cost Models 
For Jarash-Amman highway, Figure (10) shows the 
predicted values of present serviceability rating after 
maintenance at different values of maintenance cost. In 
this figure, it is obvious that the effect of maintenance by 
contract on pavement serviceability depends not only on 
quality of maintenance but also on pavement condition. 
Routine maintenance is not effective when applied on 
pavement sections with poor condition because these 
sections need higher level of maintenance to achieve the 
required improvement. For Zarqa-Syrian Boarders 
highway, it is clear that maintenance cost affected 
pavement serviceability positively (Figure 10). 
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This finding may be justified by two reasons. First, the 
contractor who performed maintenance is qualified, and 
second, the routine maintenance timing played a major 
role in improving the pavement serviceability. When 
Na’our-Dead Sea highway is considered, as shown in 
Figure (10), maintenance by contract did not improve 
pavement serviceability. High routine maintenance 
expenditures did not affect pavement sections with poor 
conditions. This is due to low performance of the 
contractor and the improper timing of maintenance. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the above findings, the following may be 
recommended: 
1. In the case of applying maintenance by contract on 
unit price basis, many terms regarding penalties and 
incentives should be included in the contract in order 
to improve the quality of maintenance achieved. 
2. Performance standards to be used in monitoring and 
controlling maintenance by contract in Jordan 
should be developed. 
3. Qualification of contractor plays a major role in the 
quality of maintenance regardless the cost of 
maintenance, thus maintenance by contract should 
be performed only by well qualified contractors. 
4. Time of applying maintenance is an important factor 
in the quality of the obtained results, thus it is 
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Figure 10. Estimated Present Serviceability Rating Using 
Maintenance Cost Models (Equations 1, 2 and 3). 
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important that routine maintenance should always be 
performed before any pavement section reaches a 
poor condition. 
5. The evaluation of pavement condition before and 
after maintenance by contract should be performed 
by a team of well experienced engineers. 
6. It is recommended to change the type of contract 
from unit price contract to performance-based 
contract. 
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